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Abstract. The call options theory of corporate security valuation is applied to the con-
tingent claims of a bank conducting loan portfolio hedging diversication under govern-
ment capital injection. We nd that diversication is not guaranteed to produce eciency
gain. It is shown that hedging diversication transaction leads to superior equity return
performance and greater safety for the bank; however, it results in increasing the e-
ciency loss from diversication. While we show that government capital injection helps
increase bank equity return and decrease equity risk, we document detrimental eects on
the eciency loss from diversication. From a normative standpoint, our results suggest
that the bailout program of government capital injection creates an incentive for banks to
pursue hedging management strategies.
Keywords: Hedging, Bank interest margin, Bank equity risk, Government capital in-
jection, Eciency
1. Introduction. Credit risk transfer tools have been extensively used by banks over
the last decades to actively manage credit risk. Banks and other lenders transfer credit
to release capital for further loan intermediation [1]. Bedendo and Bruno [2] suggest
that in times of severe funding constraints in particular during the 2007-2009 crisis, the
need to raise nancial resources becomes a principal incentive behind credit risk transfer.
During a nancial crisis, capital levels of banks are depleted and raising new capital in
public markets is dicult. Bayazitova and Shivdasani [3] suggest that the government
capital injection of the Trouble Asset Relief Program can stabilize banks by providing
a source of capital when public market alternatives are unavailable. Breitenfellner and
Wagner [4] argue that with a government bailout, there is little incentive for bank to
pursue sophisticated risk management strategies. Against this background, our focus
attempts to address the following open questions. Is hedging by loan portfolio diversi-
cation guaranteed to produce superior performance and/or greater safety for the bank
under government capital injection? Is hedging diversication ecient for the bank? Does
government capital injection help manage bank risk? Does government capital injection
lead to higher eciency gain from hedging diversication for the bank?
Addressing those issues has relevant policy implications. First, it provides a direct
assessment of the actions undertaken by regulators to preserve loan portfolio hedging
diversication of credit risk transfer under government capital injection. Brunnermeier
[5] argues that credit risk transfer practices spur excess credit growth and increase risk
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taking as a result of reduced monitoring incentives in credit risk transfer users. From
a policy standpoint, it is interesting to ask whether an individual bank benets or gets
hurt from hedging diversication of its loan portfolio. Second, as pointed out by Due
[1], credit risk transfer instruments enable banks to liberate capital. It is important to
note that a better understanding of government capital injection aects the eciency gain
or loss from loan portfolio hedging diversication. In particular, we argue that hedging
diversication and government assistance are linked through a channel of bank interest
margin, i.e., the spread between the loan rate and the deposit rate, which is one of principal
elements of bank cash ows and after-tax earnings. Indeed, the bank interest margin is
often used in the literature as a proxy for the eciency of nancial intermediation [6].
In practice, spread management is done through a \cost of goods sold" approach in
which deposits are the \material" and loans are the \work in process" [7]. Based on this
practice of banking management, we apply Merton [8] that the equity of a banking rm is
viewed as a call option on the bank's assets. The reason is that equity holders are residual
claims on the bank's assets after all of the other obligations have been met. The strike
price of the call is the book value of the bank's liabilities. When the value of the bank's
assets is less than the strike price, the value of equity is zero. This approach, however,
omits a key aspect of the behavior of bank intermediaries. It is assumed that asset
market is perfectly competitive so that quantity-setting is the relevant behavioral mode
in the market. This assumption is not applicable to loan markets since such markets
are always highly concentrated where banks set rates and face random loan levels [9].
Neal [10] argues that banks tend to concentrate their loans geographically or in particular
industries, which limits their ability to diversify across borrowers. The author further
argues that credit swaps are appealing to commercial banks whose loan portfolios are
concentrated in particular industries or geographic areas.
In light of previous work, the purpose of this paper is to develop a call option model of
bank behavior that integrates the risk considerations of the portfolio-theoretic approach
with the bailout conditions, cost and hedging considerations, and loan rate-setting behav-
ioral mode of the rm-theoretic approach. Further, our approach in calculating hedging
eciency measures uses the Merton's [8] model with the explicit treatment of bank spread
behavior under government capital injection, which contributes to an extensive literature
on the eect of bank capital (or government capital injection to the bank) on bank mar-
gin, risk, and eciency. The comparative static results of the model show that (i) loan
portfolio hedging diversication may lead to eciency loss; (ii) an increase in the hedging
cost increases the optimal bank interest margin and the equity risk, and increases the ef-
ciency loss from diversication; (iii) an increase in the loan portfolio swap diversication
transaction increases the bank interest margin, decreases the equity risk, and increases the
eciency loss; (iv) an increase in the government capital injection increases the margin,
decreases the equity risk, and decreases the eciency loss.
The introduction of credit derivative markets has given banks a new risk management
tool. These markets have shown a rapid growth. Wagner and Marsh [11] suggest that
the recent development of credit derivative instrument is to be welcomed. Our results,
the positive eect of loan swap hedging on bank interest margin and the negative eect
on bank equity risk, conrm the suggestion of Wagner and Marsh [11]. However, hedge
fund manager George Soros referred to credit default swap contracts as \toxic" and called
for banning their use [12]. Our result, the positive eect of loan swap hedging on the
eciency loss from diversication, is consistent with the argument of Cullen [12].
In addition, the recent nancial crisis raises a fundamental issue about the role of bank
equity capital. Berger and Bouwman [13] argue that not surprisingly, public outcries for
more bank capital tend to be greater after nancial crisis, and post-crisis reform proposals
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tend to focus on how capital regulation should adapt to prevent future crises.1 Our result,
the negative eect of government capital injection (thereby bank capital) on hedging
eciency loss, is largely supported by the above argument of Berger and Bouwman [13].
Our results are derived that should be of interest to investors, banks, and policy makers.
For example, as mentioned previously, hedging diversication may result in bank eciency
loss, which is not consistent with the traditional argument of Diamond [14] that banks
should be as diversied as possible. A theoretical explanation for our argument may
include bank interest margin determination under government capital injection that we
add to the literature on bank eciency. In addition, we argue that government capital
injection produces superior performance and greater safety for the bank as well as reduced
eciency loss, which is consistent with Bayazitova and Shivdasani [3]. Moreover, both
credit risk transfer and government capital injection liberate bank capital for further
loan intermediation. We argue that government capital injection relative to credit risk
transfer is ecient. Government capital injection as such contributes to the stability of
the banking system.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related literature. A call option
model of a bank is presented in Section 3. Section 4 derives the solution of the model
and the comparative static results. Section 5 conducts a numerical exercise to explain the
intuition of the comparative static results. The nal section concludes the paper.
2. Related Literature. Our theory of loan portfolio focus versus hedging diversication
is related to three strands of the literature. The rst is the literature on bank interest mar-
gin. Bank interest margin covers vital information for the eciency of the banking system
[15]. The pioneering study by Ho and Saunders [16] has been the reference framework
for many of contemporary studies of determinants of bank interest margins. The authors
construct a dealership model and nd that the interest margin depends on both the de-
gree of market competition and the interest risk. The most recent extension is studied by
Maudos and de Guevara [17], which include operating cost as an explicit component of
interest margin. Their major ndings suggest that operating cost, interest rate and credit
risk, and management quality are positively related to bank interest margin. Kasman et
al. [15] also utilize the dealership model and show that operating cost, credit risk, default
risk, and capital adequacy are positively related to bank interest margin. While we also
examine bank interest margin, our focus on the margin management with loan portfolio
hedging diversication under government capital injection, with special emphasis on the
call option valuation, takes our analysis in a dierent direction.
The second strand is the modern focus versus diversication literature. Traditional
arguments based on Diamond [14] suggest that banks should be as diversied as possi-
ble. Winton [20] investigates the merit of the proverbial wisdom of not putting all one's
eggs in one basket. DeLong [21] documents that bank mergers that are focusing in terms
of geography and activity produce superior economic performance relative to those that
are diversifying. Acharya et al. [22] study the eect of loan portfolio focus versus di-
versication on bank return and risk. Their ndings suggest that diversication is not
guaranteed to produce superior performance and/or greater safety for the bank. The pri-
mary dierence between our model and these papers is that we consider the eects of loan
portfolio hedging diversication under government capital injection on bank performance
and eciency gain/loss from diversication.
The third strand is the literature on government capital injection. Aghion et al. [23]
examine optimal bailout policy for distress banks, optimal in sense that the bailout policy
1Various such proposals have been put forth recently, for example, Kashyap et al. [18], and Acharya
et al. [19].
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minimizes costs to the public, while providing round incentives to bank managers. The
authors show that both hard and soft bailout policies have negative impacts on bank
managers' incentives. Gorton and Huang [24] claim that the benets of government
bailouts depend on the type of liquidity shock faced by banks. They conclude that
government bailouts via asset purchase are feasible in case banks face a capitalization
shock. Acharya and Yorulmazer [25] suggest that the best way for the government to
intervene is through the provision of liquidity to surviving banks. Hoshi and Kashyap
[26] suggest that besides buying distressed assets, government assistance should also be
conducted via direct equity injections to stabilize the banking system. In addition to
government bailouts, a segment of the market for credit risk is the market for credit
protection. Hedging by means of credit protection has an eect on the regulatory equity
cushion as required by the nancial authorities [4]. We add to the literature on government
intervention by integrating loan portfolio hedging diversication in order to understand
the interconnectedness between the loan market and the regulatory credit protection.
3. The Model. Consider a bank that makes decisions in a single-period horizon with
two dates, 0 and 1, t 2 [0; 1].2 At t = 0, the bank has the following balance sheet:
(1  )L+ L+B = D +K + K = (1 + )K

1
q
+ 1

(1)
where (1   )L > 0 with the conditions of 0   < 1 and L > 0 is the amount of non-
swapped loans in the credit risk transfer transaction, L > 0 is the amount of swapped
loans, B > 0 is the volume of the risk-free liquid assets, D > 0 is the quantity of deposits,
K > 0 is the stock of equity capital, K is the capital injection from the government
where  > 0, and q is a regulatory capital-to-deposits ratio [30]. Note that  measures
the degree of loan portfolio swap diversication: the larger it is, the higher degree is the
diversication relative to the focus.
Loans granted by the bank belong to a single homogeneous class of xed-rate claims
that mature at t = 1. The demand for loans faced by the bank is governed by a downward-
sloping demand function L(RL) with the condition of @L=@RL < 0, where RL > 0 is the
loan rate set by the bank [29]. Non-swapped loans are risky in that they subject to non-
performance. Swapped loans become risk-free in that they are subject to a hedging cost
RC > 0 with the condition of (RL RC) > R > 0, where R is the security market interest
rate. This condition indicates an incentive for the bank to hedging its credit risk rather
than shifting its investments from its loan portfolio to the liquid-asset market. The liquid
assets held by the bank earn the interest rate of R. The supply of deposits is perfectly
elastic at a market rate of RD > 0.
3 The bank's equity capital is tied by regulation to be
a xed proportion q of its deposits, (1+)K = qD, when the capital constraint is binding
[31]. This paper focuses on this case.
With information about Equation (1), we describe the loan portfolio swap diversication
gain based on an option valuation framework. The bank's objective is to set RL to
maximize the expected value of a call option function dened in terms of prots, subject
2Hung and Lin [27], Lin et al. [28], and Lin et al. [29] also construct a one-period option model to
analyze the eect of technology choices, the accrual eect, and the eect of deposit insurance on bank
spread behavior, respectively.
3For simplicity, we do not consider the deposit insurance premium paid by the bank in the model. Lin
et al. [29] analyze loan-risk sensitive insurance premium in a realized capped call option model. Lin et
al. [29] use a barrier-capped barrier option model to value actuarially fair deposit insurance premium.
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to Equation (1). The selection of our model's objective function follows Merton [8].4
Specically, the proposed framework starts by viewing the market value of bank equity as
a call option on the market value of loan repayments. The value of the underlying assets
follows a geometric Brownian motion:
dV = V dt+ V dW (2)
where
V = (1  )(1 +RL)L
and V is the non-swapped loan repayments with an instantaneous drift , an instantaneous
volatility , and a standard Wiener process W .
By following Equation (2) with the balance sheet constraint of Equation (1), the market
value of equity, S, will then be given by the Merton [8] formula for call options:
S = V N(d1)  Ze N(d2) (3)
where
Z =
(1 +RD)(1 + )K
q
  (1 +R)

(1 + )K

1
q
+ 1

  L

  (1 +RL  RC)L
 = R RD
d1 =
1


ln
V
Z
+  +
2
2

; d2 = d1   
and Z  the book value of the net-obligation payments, the dierence between the pay-
ment to depositors and the repayments from the liquid-asset investment and from the
credit risk transfer transection,   the risk-free discount rate, and N()  the cumula-
tive density function of the standard normal distribution.
We next follow Ronn and Verma [32] and dene the instantaneous standard deviation
of the return on S as follows:
S =
V
S
@S
@V
 =
V
S
N(d1) (4)
Given Equations (3) and (4), we can now compare the risk/return eciency of the loan
portfolio swap diversication with that of the loan portfolio without swap transaction,
and determine the eciency gain from swap diversication. Let SHP (WD) denote the
ratio of excess return to standard deviation of the loan portfolio swap and SHP (OD)
denote the same ratio for the loan focus. In other words,
SHP (WD) =
S(0 <  < 1)  (1 +R)(1 + )K
S(0 <  < 1)
(5)
and
SHP (OD) =
S( = 0)  (1 +R)(1 + )K
S( = 0)
(6)
Then, the eciency gain/loss from swap diversication can be measured by the SHP
dierential:
SHP = SHP (WD)  SHP (OD) (7)
The SHP dierential measures the mean return dierential, per unit of standard devia-
tion, that accrues from holding the loan portfolio with swap diversication in lieu of the
loan focus. Equation (7) can be used to question whether the bank benets (SHP > 0)
or gets hurt (SHP < 0) from hedging diversication of its loan portfolio.
4Note that imperfectly competitive loan market considered in our model is ignored in Merton [8].
Results to be derived from our model do not extend to the case where the loan market faced by the bank
is perfectly competitive.
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4. Solution and Results. Partially dierentiating Equation (3) with respect to RL, the
rst-order condition is given by:
@S
@RL
=
@V
@RL
N(d1) + V
@N(d1)
@d1
@d1
@RL
  @Z
@RL
e N(d2)  Ze  @N(d2)
@d2
@d2
@RL
= 0 (8)
We require that the second-order condition be satised, @2S=@R2L < 0. The optimal loan
rate can be chosen based on Equation (8) where the marginal loan repayments of loan
rate equal the marginal net-obligation payments. We can further substitute the optimal
rate to obtain SHP remaining on the optimization.
Having examined the solution to the bank's optimization problem, we further consider
the eects on the optimal loan rate (and thus the optimal bank interest marginal), the
standard deviation of the equity return, and the eciency gain from swap diversication
from changes in the parameters of the model. Based on Equations (8), (4), and (7), we
have the following comparative static results, respectively:
@RL
@A
=   @
2S
@RL@A

@2S
@R2L
(9)
dS
dA
=
@S
@A
+
@S
@RL
@RL
@A
(10)
dSHP
dA
=
@SHP
@A
+
@SHP
@RL
@RL
@A
(11)
where A = RC , , or .
In general, the added complexity of the call option does not always lead to clear-cut
results in Equations (9), (10), and (11). However, we can speak of tendencies for reason-
able numerical parameter levels corresponding roughly to a hypothetical bank. Toward
that end, we compute derivatives of the value function of the call option. The numerical
examples provide intuition regarding the problems at hand, for example, the comparative
static results of Equations (9), (10), and (11) in the model.
Table 1. Responsiveness of bank interest margin to hedging cost
(RL%; L)
RC% (4:5; 200) (4:6; 199) (4:7; 197) (4:8; 194) (4:9; 190) (5:0; 185) (5:1; 179)
S
0:1 34:2912 34:3181 34:2290 34:0228 33:6982 33:2547 32:6917
0:2 34:2791 34:3060 34:2170 34:0109 33:6865 33:2432 32:6804
0:3 34:2671 34:2940 34:2051 33:9990 33:6748 33:2317 32:6692
0:4 34:2550 34:2819 34:1931 33:9872 33:6631 33:2202 32:6580
0:5 34:2429 34:2699 34:1811 33:9753 33:6514 33:2087 32:6467
0:6 34:2309 34:2578 34:1691 33:9634 33:6397 33:1972 32:6355
@RL=@RC(10
 4)
0:1! 0:2 { 1:6231 5:5770 9:5009 13:4272 17:3997 {
0:2! 0:3 { 1:6222 5:5764 9:5007 13:4272 17:4002 {
0:3! 0:4 { 1:6213 5:5758 9:5004 13:4273 17:4006 {
0:4! 0:5 { 1:6204 5:5753 9:5001 13:4274 17:4010 {
0:5! 0:6 { 1:6196 5:5747 9:4999 13:4275 17:4015 {
Notes: Parameter values, unless stated otherwise: R = 3:5%, RD = 2:5%, K = 15, q = 8:5%,
 = 0:3,  = 0:1, and  = 0:1. The computed results of @2S=@R2L at various levels of RC are
consistently negative in sign, which conrms the required second-order condition of Equation (8).
The values in the shaded areas are computed based on an approximate optimal loan rate of 4.6%.
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5. Numerical Analysis. In the following numerical analysis, the parameter values, un-
less otherwise indicated, are assumed to be R = 3:5%, RD = 2:5%, K = 15, q = 8:5%,
and  = 0:3. Let (RL%; L) change from (4:5; 200) to (5:1; 179) due to the conditions
of @L=@RL < 0 and @
2L=@R2L < 0. These parameter levels for simulation exercises are
explained as follows.
(i) The assumption of RL > R = 3:5% indicates that there is scope for earning-asset
portfolio substitution [33]. The assumption of R > RD = 2:5% implies that the capital
constraint is binding. The condition of RL > RD demonstrates that the bank interest
margin is recognized as one of the primary elements of after-tax earnings.
(ii) The specication of capital adequacy requirement is consistent with the Basel ap-
proach, which is set by the capital-to-deposits ratio q = (1 + )K=D = 8:5% [30]. In the
case where  = 0, the capital-to-asset ratio at t = 0 is K=L = 15=200 = 7:5%, which does
not meet the capital adequacy requirement of 8.0%. This distressed situation explains
the bank's capital level is depleted. In the case where  = 0:1, the capital-to-asset ratio
at t = 0 is (15 + 1:5)=200 = 8:25%, which meets the requirement. This explains the gov-
ernment capital injection is anticipated by the bank in distress when the bank's raising
new capital in public markets is dicult [3].
Table 2. Responsiveness of bank equity risk to hedging cost
(RL%; L)
RC% (4:5; 200) (4:6; 199) (4:7; 197) (4:8; 194) (4:9; 190) (5:0; 185) (5:1; 179)
S
0:1 1:1821 1:1794 1:1758 1:1712 1:1655 1:1585 1:1502
0:2 1:1823 1:1796 1:1760 1:1714 1:1657 1:1587 1:1504
0:3 1:1825 1:1798 1:1762 1:1716 1:1659 1:1589 1:1506
0:4 1:1827 1:1800 1:1764 1:1718 1:1661 1:1591 1:1508
0:5 1:1829 1:1802 1:1766 1:1720 1:1662 1:1593 1:1510
0:6 1:1831 1:1804 1:1768 1:1722 1:1664 1:1595 1:1512
@S=@RC : direct eect (‰)
0:1! 0:2 1:9438 1:9409 1:9375 1:9338 1:9295 1:9247 1:9191
0:2! 0:3 1:9439 1:9409 1:9376 1:9339 1:9296 1:9248 1:9192
0:3! 0:4 1:9439 1:9410 1:9377 1:9339 1:9297 1:9249 1:9193
0:4! 0:5 1:9440 1:9411 1:9378 1:9340 1:9298 1:9249 1:9194
0:5! 0:6 1:9441 1:9412 1:9379 1:9341 1:9299 1:9250 1:9195
(@S=@RL)(@RL=@RC): indirect eect (10
 5)
0:1! 0:2 {  0:4340  2:0197  4:3919  7:6684  12:0542 {
0:2! 0:3 {  0:4338  2:0197  4:3922  7:6690  12:0553 {
0:3! 0:4 {  0:4336  2:0197  4:3924  7:6696  12:0565 {
0:4! 0:5 {  0:4335  2:0197  4:3927  7:6702  12:0576 {
0:5! 0:6 {  0:4333  2:0197  4:3929  7:6708  12:0588 {
dS=dRC : total eect (‰)
0:1! 0:2 { 1:9365 1:9173 1:8899 1:8529 1:8041 {
0:2! 0:3 { 1:9366 1:9174 1:8899 1:8529 1:8042 {
0:3! 0:4 { 1:9367 1:9175 1:8900 1:8530 1:8043 {
0:4! 0:5 { 1:9368 1:9176 1:8901 1:8531 1:8044 {
0:5! 0:6 { 1:9368 1:9177 1:8902 1:8532 1:8044 {
Notes: Parameter values, unless stated otherwise: R = 3:5%, RD = 2:5%, K = 15, q = 8:5%,
 = 0:3,  = 0:1, and  = 0:1. The values in the shaded areas are computed based on an
approximate optimal loan rate of 4.6% observed from Table 1.
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(iii) Using descriptive sample statistics for rms provided by Brockman and Turtle [34]:
the mean value of asset volatility is 0.2904 with a corresponding standard deviation of
0.2608, we assume  = 0:3 used in our numerical analysis.
5.1. Increases in hedging cost. The ndings based on Equations (9), (10), and (11)
are summarized in Tables 1, 2, and 3, respectively, where A = RC ,  = 0:1, and  = 0:1.
Note that the parameter value of RC is various from 0.1% to 0.6% due to the condition
of (RL  RC) > R, as mentioned previously.
In Table 1, we have the results of S > 0 and @RL=@RC > 0. It is interesting that, as the
hedging cost in the credit risk transfer transaction increases, the optimal bank interest
margin is increased. The result is understood because the bank must now provide a return
based on a higher hedging cost base, as the hedging cost increases. One way the bank may
attempt to augment its total returns is by shifting its investments from its loan portfolio
to the liquid-asset market. If loan demand is relatively rate-elastic, a downside scale of
loan portfolio is possible at an increased margin. Accordingly, the bank passes the burden
of rising hedging expenses to borrowers by widening the bank interest margin. This result
Table 3. Responsiveness of eciency gain to hedging cost
(RL%; L)
RC% (4:5; 200) (4:6; 199) (4:7; 197) (4:8; 194) (4:9; 190) (5:0; 185) (5:1; 179)
SHP
0:1  1:7776  1:7653  1:7430  1:7108  1:6684  1:6159  1:5529
0:2  1:7902  1:7779  1:7556  1:7233  1:6808  1:6281  1:5650
0:3  1:8028  1:7905  1:7682  1:7358  1:6932  1:6403  1:5770
0:4  1:8154  1:8031  1:7808  1:7483  1:7056  1:6526  1:5890
0:5  1:8280  1:8157  1:7933  1:7608  1:7180  1:6648  1:6011
0:6  1:8406  1:8283  1:8059  1:7733  1:7304  1:6770  1:6131
@SHP=@RC : direct eect (%)
0:1! 0:2  12:5999  12:6181  12:5922  12:5217  12:4063  12:2458  12:0402
0:2! 0:3  12:5933  12:6115  12:5856  12:5152  12:3999  12:2395  12:0340
0:3! 0:4  12:5867  12:6049  12:5790  12:5087  12:3934  12:2331  12:0277
0:4! 0:5  12:5801  12:5983  12:5725  12:5021  12:3869  12:2267  12:0215
0:5! 0:6  12:5735  12:5917  12:5659  12:4956  12:3805  12:2203  12:0152
(@SHP=@RL)(@RL=@RC): indirect eect (10
 4)
0:1! 0:2 { 0:2004 1:2418 3:0647 5:6855 9:1443 {
0:2! 0:3 { 0:2000 1:2431 3:0713 5:7010 9:1725 {
0:3! 0:4 { 0:1996 1:2444 3:0779 5:7165 9:2006 {
0:4! 0:5 { 0:1992 1:2457 3:0845 5:7320 9:2288 {
0:5! 0:6 { 0:1988 1:2470 3:0911 5:7475 9:2569 {
dSHP=dRC : total eect (%)
0:1! 0:2 {  12:6161  12:5798  12:4911  12:3495  12:1544 {
0:2! 0:3 {  12:6095  12:5732  12:4845  12:3429  12:1477 {
0:3! 0:4 {  12:6029  12:5666  12:4779  12:3362  12:1411 {
0:4! 0:5 {  12:5963  12:5600  12:4713  12:3296  12:1344 {
0:5! 0:6 {  12:5897  12:5534  12:4647  12:3230  12:1278 {
Notes: Parameter values, unless stated otherwise: R = 3:5%, RD = 2:5%, K = 15, q = 8:5%,
 = 0:3,  = 0:1, and  = 0:1 The values in the shaded areas are computed based on an
approximate optimal loan rate of 4.6% observed from Table 1.
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is implicitly consistent with the ndings of Kasman et al. [15] that bank interest margins
are positively related to hedging (operating) cost.
The results obtained from Table 2 are based on the computation of Equation (10) where
A = RC . The direct eect captures an increase in S due to an increase in RC , holding
the optimal bank interest margin constant. The positive direct eect observed from the
second panel is understood because an increase in RC makes credit risk transactions
more costly to conduct. In response to this, the bank has a disincentive to conduct
credit risk transfer transaction and hence increase bank equity risk, ceteris paribus. The
indirect eect observed from the third panel is negative in sign. This is because an
increase in RC leads to an increase in the optimal loan and a decrease in the volume
of loans (and thus a decrease in the bank's equity risk). Since the negative indirect
eect is not sucient to oset the positive direct eect, a total positive response of S
to an increase in RC is observed from the last panel. This implies that the bank passes
the burden of rising hedging expenses to borrowers, resulting in increasing credit risk in
bank lending and enhancing bank equity risk. Counterparty credit risk in the hedging
diversication transaction is a source of hedging cost. Arora et al. [35] argue that a
market participant could suer losses through the bankruptcy of a counterparty which is
through the collateral channel. Our nding is largely supported by the argument above.
It is necessary to elaborate on the issue of eciency gain from swap hedging diversi-
cation at various levels of hedging cost. We have the result of SHP < 0 observed from
the rst panel of Table 3. This result demonstrates that the bank can potentially hurt
form loan portfolio hedging diversication at a given level of hedging cost. Our result
may be consistent with an empirical nding of D'Souza and Lai [36], and bank eciency
is not signicant. It is interesting that, as the hedging cost increases, the eciency loss
is increased captured by the negative direct eect observed form the second panel, while
the eciency loss is decreased captured by the positive indirect eect observed from the
third panel. The indirect eect is insucient to oset the negative direct eect to give an
Table 4. Responsiveness of bank interest margin to swap diversication transaction
(RL%; L)
 (4:5; 200) (4:6; 199) (4:7; 197) (4:8; 194) (4:9; 190) (5:0; 185) (5:1; 179)
S
0:1 34:2429 34:2699 34:1811 33:9753 33:6514 33:2087 32:6467
0:2 31:8000 31:8422 31:7827 31:6204 31:3544 30:9839 30:5089
0:3 29:4114 29:4700 29:4413 29:3243 29:1181 28:8223 28:4369
0:4 27:1036 27:1805 27:1849 27:1158 26:9724 26:7545 26:4625
0:5 24:9236 25:0215 25:0622 25:0447 24:9683 24:8332 24:6397
0:6 22:9585 23:0818 23:1636 23:2030 23:1997 23:1535 23:0651
@RL=@
0:1! 0:2 { 0:1312 0:2504 0:3684 0:4866 0:6064 {
0:2! 0:3 { 0:1619 0:2998 0:4364 0:5736 0:7139 {
0:3! 0:4 { 0:2098 0:3737 0:5365 0:7008 0:8704 {
0:4! 0:5 { 0:2907 0:4935 0:6952 0:9004 1:1149 {
0:5! 0:6 { 0:4415 0:7063 0:9699 1:2398 1:5262 {
Notes: Parameter values, unless stated otherwise: R = 3:5%, RD = 2:5%, K = 15, q = 8:5%,
 = 0:3, RC = 0:5%, and  = 0:1. The values in the shaded areas are computed based on an
approximate optimal loan rate of 4.6% when 0:1    0:3, 4.7% when 0:4    0:5, and 4.8%
when  = 0:6. The corresponding results are conrmed by the validness of the second-order
condition.
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Table 5. Responsiveness of bank equity risk to swap diversication transaction
(RL%; L)
 (4:5; 200) (4:6; 199) (4:7; 197) (4:8; 194) (4:9; 190) (5:0; 185) (5:1; 179)
S
0:1 1:1829 1:1802 1:1766 1:1720 1:1662 1:1593 1:1510
0:2 1:1586 1:1556 1:1516 1:1464 1:1400 1:1323 1:1230
0:3 1:1276 1:1242 1:1196 1:1138 1:1065 1:0978 1:0872
0:4 1:0867 1:0828 1:0775 1:0707 1:0624 1:0523 1:0402
0:5 1:0303 1:0257 1:0195 1:0116 1:0018 0:9900 0:9759
0:6 0:9482 0:9426 0:9352 0:9257 0:9140 0:9000 0:8832
@S=@: direct eect
0:1! 0:2  0:2426  0:2458  0:2501  0:2556  0:2624  0:2706  0:2803
0:2! 0:3  0:3099  0:3140  0:3194  0:3263  0:3348  0:3451  0:3573
0:3! 0:4  0:4093  0:4145  0:4215  0:4304  0:4413  0:4544  0:4700
0:4! 0:5  0:5639  0:5708  0:5801  0:5918  0:6062  0:6233  0:6436
0:5! 0:6  0:8215  0:8308  0:8432  0:8588  0:8778  0:9002  0:9262
(@S=@RL)(@RL=@): indirect eect
0:1! 0:2 {  0:0035  0:0091  0:0170  0:0278  0:0420 {
0:2! 0:3 {  0:0048  0:0122  0:0226  0:0367  0:0553 {
0:3! 0:4 {  0:0071  0:0172  0:0315  0:0507  0:0764 {
0:4! 0:5 {  0:0114  0:0262  0:0470  0:0750  0:1125 {
0:5! 0:6 {  0:0203  0:0440  0:0769  0:1211  0:1801 {
dS=d: total eect
0:1! 0:2 {  0:2493  0:2592  0:2727  0:2902  0:3126 {
0:2! 0:3 {  0:3188  0:3315  0:3489  0:3715  0:4004 {
0:3! 0:4 {  0:4216  0:4386  0:4618  0:4920  0:5308 {
0:4! 0:5 {  0:5822  0:6062  0:6388  0:6812  0:7358 {
0:5! 0:6 {  0:8511  0:8872  0:9357  0:9988  1:0803 {
Notes: Parameter values, unless stated otherwise: R = 3:5%, RD = 2:5%, K = 15, q = 8:5%,
 = 0:3, RC = 0:5%, and  = 0:1. The values in the shaded areas are computed based
on approximate optimal loan rate of 4.6% when 0:1    0:3, 4.7% when 0:4    0:5,
and 4.8% when  = 0:6 observed from Table 4.
overall negative response of eciency loss to an increase in the hedging cost observed from
the last panel. This indicates that an increase in the hedging cost leads to an increase
in eciency loss from loan portfolio hedging diversication for the bank. The intuition is
straightforward. An increase in the hedging cost increases the operation cost and hence
decreases the bank's equity return. In the meanwhile, an increase in the hedging cost
increases the bank's equity risk, as mentioned previously. Accordingly, the eciency loss
from swap hedging diversication is increased due to an increase in the hedging cost. Our
ndings are consistent with Arora et al. [35]: credit risk transfer in market participants
suers losses due to the hedging cost burden.
5.2. Increases in loan portfolio swap diversication transaction. The ndings
based on Equations (9), (10), and (11) are summarized in Tables 4, 5, and 6, respectively,
where 0:1  A =   0:6, RC = 0:5%, and  = 0:1.
The result of @RL=@ > 0 observed from the last panel in Table 4 demonstrates that
an increase in the amount of the swap hedging diversication transaction increases the
optimal bank interest margin. The result is understood because the bank provides a
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Table 6. Responsiveness of eciency gain to swap diversication transaction
(RL%; L)
 (4:5; 200) (4:6; 199) (4:7; 197) (4:8; 194) (4:9; 190) (5:0; 185) (5:1; 179)
SHP
0:1  1:8280  1:8157  1:7933  1:7608  1:7180  1:6648  1:6011
0:2  3:6326  3:6066  3:5603  3:4935  3:4059  3:2972  3:1671
0:3  5:4016  5:3599  5:2873  5:1834  5:0479  4:8803  4:6798
0:4  7:1133  7:0524  6:9495  6:8041  6:6156  6:3832  6:1058
0:5  8:7243  8:6380  8:4978  8:3030  8:0526  7:7450  7:3786
0:6  10:1369  10:0132  9:8219  9:5618  9:2312  8:8278  8:3488
@SHP=@: direct eect
0:1! 0:2  18:0458  17:9092  17:6698  17:3267  16:8787  16:3240  15:6606
0:2! 0:3  17:6906  17:5328  17:2694  16:8991  16:4202  15:8305  15:1268
0:3! 0:4  17:1168  16:9246  16:6219  16:2070  15:6774  15:0298  14:2597
0:4! 0:5  16:1095  15:8563  15:4839  14:9894  14:3692  13:6179  12:7284
0:5! 0:6  14:1266  13:7519  13:2404  12:5873  11:7862  10:8283  9:7017
(@SHP=@RL)(@RL=@): indirect eect
0:1! 0:2 { 0:0161 0:0560 0:1199 0:2083 0:3226 {
0:2! 0:3 { 0:0420 0:1388 0:2917 0:5025 0:7757 {
0:3! 0:4 { 0:0875 0:2715 0:5573 0:9496 1:4591 {
0:4! 0:5 { 0:1771 0:5079 1:0107 1:6969 2:5911 {
0:5! 0:6 { 0:3808 0:9900 1:8895 3:1056 4:6936 {
dSHP=d: total eect
0:1! 0:2 {  17:8931  17:6138  17:2068  16:6704  16:0014 {
0:2! 0:3 {  17:4908  17:1306  16:6074  15:9177  15:0547 {
0:3! 0:4 {  16:8371  16:3504  15:6498  14:7279  13:5707 {
0:4! 0:5  15:6792  14:9760  13:9788  12:6723  11:0268 {
0:5! 0:6 {  13:3711  12:2504  10:6979  8:6806  6:1347 {
Notes: Parameter values, unless stated otherwise: R = 3:5%, RD = 2:5%, K = 15, q = 8:5%,
 = 0:3, RC = 0:5%, and  = 0:1. The values in the shaded areas are computed based on
approximate optimal loan rate of 4.6% when 0:1    0:3, 4.7% when 0:4    0:5, and
4.8% when  = 0:6 observed from Table 4.
return based on a larger risk-free asset base when the hedging transaction increases. One
way the bank may attempt to augment its total returns is by shifting its investments
to the liquid-asset market from its loan portfolio at an increased loan rate. This result
emphasizes the impact of hedging diversication on loan scale which is perfectly in line
with the bank's objective of making failure less likely. Moreover, under the assumption
that swap hedging transaction helps mitigate the underinvestment problem in the business
sector, one would expect the impact of the transaction on loan growth to strengthen [37].
However, Bedendo and Bruno [2] argue that banks may be tempted to use the resources
generated through swap hedging transaction to reconstitute liquidity on reduce leverage
rather than provide credit to the real economy. Our result is consistent with the argument
above.
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Table 7. Responsiveness of bank interest margin to government capital injection
(RL%; L)
 (4:5; 200) (4:6; 199) (4:7; 197) (4:8; 194) (4:9; 190) (5:0; 185) (5:1; 179)
S
0:1 34:2429 34:2699 34:1811 33:9753 33:6514 33:2087 32:6467
0:2 35:2965 35:3271 35:2433 35:0439 34:7280 34:2949 33:7446
0:3 36:3727 36:4070 36:3284 36:1358 35:8283 35:4055 34:8677
0:4 37:4715 37:5097 37:4365 37:2509 36:9522 36:5403 36:0157
0:5 38:5929 38:6350 38:5674 38:3892 38:0998 37:6993 37:1885
0:6 39:7369 39:7829 39:7211 39:5505 39:2708 38:8823 38:3861
@RL=@ (%)
0:1! 0:2 { 3:1583 4:2680 5:4308 6:6963 8:1276 {
0:2! 0:3 { 3:2743 4:4979 5:7822 7:1838 8:7751 {
0:3! 0:4 { 3:3921 4:7323 6:1413 7:6836 9:4421 {
0:4! 0:5 { 3:5118 4:9710 6:5082 8:1959 10:1293 {
0:5! 0:6 { 3:6333 5:2140 6:8826 8:7209 10:8373 {
Notes: Parameter values, unless stated otherwise: R = 3:5%, RD = 2:5%, K = 15, q = 8:5%,
 = 0:3, RC = 0:5%, and  = 0:1. The values in the shaded areas are computed based on an
approximate optimal loan rate of 4.6%. The corresponding results are conrmed by the
validness of the second-order condition.
The results presented in Table 5 are based on Equation (10) where A = . The positive
direct eect is observed from the second panel. This is because an increase in  makes
loans less risky to grant, and hence decrease the bank's equity risk, ceteris paribus. The
indirect eect is also negative in sign observed from the third panel. As mentioned in
Table 4, an increase in  increases RL. In response to this, the bank has an incentive to
reduce the amount of loans it grants, and hence decrease the bank's equity risk. Overall,
since the indirect eect reinforces the direct eect to give a negative response of S to
an increase in , we state that an increase in the hedging diversication transaction
decreases the bank's equity risk. Our result is consistent with the ndings of Cebenoyan
and Strahan [38]: swap hedging transaction activities help manage bank risk.
The consistent results of SHP < 0 evaluated at various optimal bank interest margins
are obtained from the rst panel of Table 6. We state that the swap hedging diversica-
tion is harmful to the bank. The direct eect observed from the second panel is negative
because an increase in the swap diversication transaction directly increases the bank's
net-obligation payments and hence the bank's equity return is decreased, ceteris paribus.
The negative direct eect demonstrates that the eciency loss from the swap diversi-
cation is positively related to the swap transaction. The indirect eect observed from
the third panel is positive in sign. We can argue that the eect of the swap transaction
on the eciency gain is uncertain due to the fact that an increase in  decreases the
bank's prot by L(RL) in every possible state. The indirect eect is insucient to oset
the direct eect to give an overall positive response of the eciency loss to an increase
in the swap transaction. Therefore, we suggest that the swap diversication transaction
activities help manage bank equity return and risk, but have the incremental eect on
eciency loss. The former is largely supported by Cebenoyan and Strahan [38], while the
latter is implicitly consistent with Keys et al. [39].
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Table 8. Responsiveness of bank equity risk to government capital injection
(RL%; L)
 (4:5; 200) (4:6; 199) (4:7; 197) (4:8; 194) (4:9; 190) (5:0; 185) (5:1; 179)
S
0:1 1:1829 1:1802 1:1766 1:1720 1:1662 1:1593 1:1510
0:2 1:1661 1:1634 1:1596 1:1548 1:1487 1:1414 1:1325
0:3 1:1494 1:1466 1:1427 1:1376 1:1313 1:1235 1:1141
0:4 1:1327 1:1299 1:1259 1:1206 1:1139 1:1057 1:0958
0:5 1:1162 1:1133 1:1091 1:1036 1:0966 1:0880 1:0776
0:6 1:0997 1:0967 1:0924 1:0867 1:0794 1:0704 1:0595
@S=@: direct eect
0:1! 0:2  0:1678  0:1684  0:1698  0:1720  0:1753  0:1795  0:1850
0:2! 0:3  0:1671  0:1677  0:1691  0:1714  0:1745  0:1787  0:1841
0:3! 0:4  0:1665  0:1670  0:1684  0:1706  0:1737  0:1779  0:1831
0:4! 0:5  0:1658  0:1663  0:1676  0:1698  0:1729  0:1769  0:1821
0:5! 0:6  0:1650  0:1655  0:1668  0:1690  0:1720  0:1760  0:1810
(@S=@RL)(@RL=@): indirect eect (%)
0:1! 0:2 {  0:0845  0:1546  0:2511  0:3825  0:5632 {
0:2! 0:3 {  0:0895  0:1693  0:2806  0:4335  0:6455 {
0:3! 0:4 {  0:0947  0:1847  0:3118  0:4881  0:7342 {
0:4! 0:5 {  0:1000  0:2008  0:3448  0:5462  0:8295 {
0:5! 0:6 {  0:1054  0:2176  0:3796  0:6080  0:9315 {
dS=d: total eect (%)
0:1! 0:2 {  16:9196  17:1307  17:4552  17:9087  18:5158 {
0:2! 0:3 {  16:8613  17:0799  17:4158  17:8861  18:5182 {
0:3! 0:4 {  16:7984  17:0248  17:3729  17:8615  18:5209 {
0:4! 0:5 {  16:7308  16:9654  17:3265  17:8348  18:5240 {
0:5! 0:6 {  16:6582  16:9015  17:2765  17:8059  18:5274 {
Notes: Parameter values, unless stated otherwise: R = 3:5%, RD = 2:5%, K = 15, q = 8:5%,
 = 0:3, RC = 0:5%, and  = 0:1. The values in the shaded areas are computed based on an
approximate optimal loan rate of 4.6%.
5.3. Increases in government capital injection. The ndings based on Equations (9),
(10), and (11) are summarized in Tables 7, 8, and 9, respectively, where 0:1  A =   0:6,
RC = 0:5%, and  = 0:1.
Based on the result of @RL=@ > 0 observed from Table 7, we state that government
capital injection leads to an increase in the optimal loan rate and a decrease in the volume
of loans. The intuitive reason for this result is the following: government capital injection
creates a link between both sides of the bank's balance sheet. As the government capital
injection to the bank increases, the bank provides a return based on a larger equity
capital base. One way the bank may attempt to augment its total returns is by shifting
its investments to the liquid-asset market and away from its loan portfolio at an increased
loan rate. Our result emphasizes the direct impact of government capital injection on
loan volumes which is consistent with the regulatory bailout objective of making failure
less likely. Our nding is supported by the argument of Berger and Bouwman [13]: public
outcries for more bank capital tend to be greater after nancial crises.
The results presented in Table 8 are based on Equation (10) where A = . The nega-
tive direct eect is observed from the second panel. Intuitively, the negative direct eect
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Table 9. Responsiveness of eciency gain to government capital injection
(RL%; L)
 (4:5; 200) (4:6; 199) (4:7; 197) (4:8; 194) (4:9; 190) (5:0; 185) (5:1; 179)
SHP
0:1  1:8280  1:8157  1:7933  1:7608  1:7180  1:6648  1:6011
0:2  1:8124  1:7996  1:7765  1:7432  1:6994  1:6451  1:5800
0:3  1:7950  1:7816  1:7578  1:7235  1:6787  1:6231  1:5565
0:4  1:7757  1:7616  1:7370  1:7018  1:6558  1:5988  1:5306
0:5  1:7542  1:7394  1:7140  1:6778  1:6305  1:5721  1:5020
0:6  1:7306  1:7151  1:6888  1:6514  1:6028  1:5427  1:4707
@SHP=@: direct eect
0:1! 0:2 0:1556 0:1613 0:1681 0:1763 0:1859 0:1973 0:2108
0:2! 0:3 0:1741 0:1802 0:1876 0:1964 0:2070 0:2195 0:2345
0:3! 0:4 0:1937 0:2001 0:2081 0:2177 0:2292 0:2430 0:2595
0:4! 0:5 0:2143 0:2211 0:2296 0:2400 0:2525 0:2676 0:2857
0:5! 0:6 0:2359 0:2431 0:2522 0:2634 0:2770 0:2934 0:3132
(@SHP=@RL)(@RL=@): indirect eect (%)
0:1! 0:2 { 0:3877 0:9547 1:7671 2:8663 4:3236 {
0:2! 0:3 { 0:4206 1:0370 1:9286 3:1441 4:7678 {
0:3! 0:4 { 0:4563 1:1260 2:1028 3:4439 5:2486 {
0:4! 0:5 { 0:4950 1:2223 2:2909 3:7680 5:7702 {
0:5! 0:6 { 0:5369 1:3264 2:4942 4:1186 6:3367 {
dSHP=d: total eect
0:1! 0:2 { 0:1652 0:1777 0:1940 0:2146 0:2405 {
0:2! 0:3 { 0:1844 0:1980 0:2157 0:2384 0:2672 {
0:3! 0:4 { 0:2047 0:2193 0:2387 0:2636 0:2955 {
0:4! 0:5 { 0:2261 0:2418 0:2629 0:2902 0:3253 {
0:5! 0:6 { 0:2485 0:2655 0:2883 0:3182 0:3567 {
Notes: Parameter values, unless stated otherwise: R = 3:5%, RD = 2:5%, K = 15, q = 8:5%,
 = 0:3, RC = 0:5%, and  = 0:1. The values in the shaded areas are computed based on an
approximate optimal loan rate of 4.6%.
demonstrates a decrease in the bank's equity risk due to an increase in the government
capital injection, holding the optimal bank interest margin constant. This result is un-
derstood that an increase in the government capital injection provides a source of capital
to the distressed bank, resulting in decreasing the bank's equity risk since liquidity shock
is overcome ([3,24]). The negative indirect eect arises because an increase in the gov-
ernment capital injection increases in the optimal loan rate (as mentioned in Table 7),
resulting in decreasing loans and thus decreasing the bank's equity risk. Overall, since the
indirect eect reinforces the direct eect to give a negative response of S to an increase
in , we state that an increase in government capital injection decreases the bank's eq-
uity risk. This indicates that the government capital injection can stabilize the distressed
bank, which is consistent with the ndings of Bayazitova and Shivdasani [3].
The result of SHP < 0 is obtained from the rst panel of Table 9. This means that the
bank potentially harms from swap hedging diversication at a given level of government
capital injection. The positive direct eect is observed from the second panel. This result
indicates that the eciency loss from loan portfolio hedging diversication is negatively
related to government capital injection, ceteris paribus. The indirect eect is also positive
A CALL OPTION FRAMEWORK FOR LOAN SWAP HEDGING 1945
in sign observed form the third panel. The indirect eect reinforces the direct eect to
give an overall positive response of SHP to an increase in . As can be seen from
the result of dSHP=d > 0 in the last panel, an increase in the government capital
injection decreases the eciency loss from diversication. Hence, it appears that the
distressed bank may be taking advantage of the loss from swap diversication when the
government capital injection increases. Government capital injection as such may capture
a reduced loss eciency to the distressed bank's extension of credit, yielding an increased
return and a reduced equity risk for the bank. Our results are supported by Bayazitova
and Shivdasani [3].
6. Conclusions. The goal of this paper is to explore the role played by loan portfolio
hedging diversication transaction activities in a bank under government capital injection.
In particular, this paper addresses the impacts of hedging and capital on bank performance
and eciency gain from hedging. On the positive side, our ndings suggest that hedging
and capital helps to enhance equity return with a corresponding reduced equity risk for
the bank. On the negative side, we argue that hedging diversication is not guaranteed to
produce eciency gain; however, an increase in the government capital injection increases
bank equity return, decreases bank equity risk, and decreases the eciency loss from
hedging diversication. Our analysis sheds light on the economic roles of hedging and
government capital injection. One implication is that future theoretical exploration of
the economic roles of hedging and government capital injection ought to pay attention to
counterparty credit risk in the hedging activities as well as dierent means of government
intervention when bank performance and safety are analyzed.
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